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We propose a definition of determinism for a physical system that includes, besides the measure-
ment device, the surrounding environment. This enlarged system is assumed to follow a predefined
trajectory starting from some (unknown) initial conditions that play the role of hidden variables
for the experiment. These assumptions, which are different from realism, allow us to derive a type
of time Bell inequalities, which are violated by Quantum Mechanics. In order to illustrate this
violation, we discuss the particular case of measurements on a spin 1/2 particle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let us consider the time evolution of an isolated physical system, either classical or quantum. Does it always exist,
as a matter of principle, a trajectory which, from some initial conditions, gives the values of the different quantities of
the system during some finite duration of time, as it is, for example, the case in Newtonian mechanics, modulo some
regularity conditions? This constitutes the concept of determinism in nature (sensibly different from the concept
of realism, as we discuss later). As a matter of fact, determinism can be present under some circumstances, but
the problem we want to address is whether determinism is always present regardless of our capacity of prediction
in practice. Therefore, to discard determinism it suffices to find at least one example where it is contradicted by
experimental data. This is what we are going to discuss along the present paper. Our claim is that determinism fails
because it enters in contradiction with Quantum Mechanics (QM) and, maybe, with experiments.
Obviously QM, as described in standard textbooks, is an extremely successful non-deterministic theory, since the
result of measurements can only be predicted in an statistical way. This is so even if the equation of motion (the
Schrödinger equation, for non relativistic QM) provides the future state of the system when the initial conditions
are specified. In this sense, the time evolution of QM might be considered as deterministic. It is the measurement
process that introduces the non deterministic nature of QM, since the result of a measurement can not, in general,
be predicted with certainty from the knowledge of the state corresponding to the quantum state. Moreover, this
state is modified by the measurement, leading to the well known collapse of the wave function. In other words, the
measurement process is invasive (in the precise sense described in [1]) with respect to the system to be measured.
Thus, even if we admit that the quantum time evolution can be considered as deterministic, the action of the
measurement device on the system under consideration appears as an extra ingredient that modifies the conditions
of that system. Once we accept this, the question arises: Is it possible to postulate a deterministic evolution that
describes, not only the quantum system (represented by Q) under study, but also the measurement apparatus and,
if necessary, the surrounding environment? We will refer to this system as the enlarged system (designated by E).
Our deterministic hypothesis will be formulated for this enlarged system, E, and not for the quantum system, Q, to
be measured. This has to be clearly formulated in order to avoid further misunderstandings: The state of Q may be
(and in general it will be) altered upon interaction with the measurement device in an impredictable way. However,
system E as a whole will follow a predetermined trajectory that evolves from some initial conditions, according to the
deterministic hypothesis we want to be tested by confrontation with the experiment.
The definition of determinism we introduced above differs from realism, can be discarded by proposed experiments,
and is based on testing some time Bell-like inequalities, which take the form
|P (a, b)− P (a, c)| ≤ 1− P (b, c), (1)
where P (a, b) is the expected value associated to consecutive measurements of spin directions a and b (similarly for
the rest of magnitudes on this equation), on the same particle.
2As shown in the next Section, we can find some scenarios in which determinism enters in contradiction with
QM. The reason why the violation of usual Bell inequalities can be reconciled with non local realism, while our
time Bell-like inequalities cannot be reconciled with determinism, is that the deterministic assumption is a stronger
condition than realism. More precisely, realism postulates the existence of some hidden variables values behind the
outcome of a performed measurement, without requiring that these hidden values remain the same after performing
the measurement. On the contrary, the deterministic assumption for the enlarged system E postulates the existence
of the same standing hidden variable values (the unknown initial conditions) behind all the successive self-responses
of E along a certain finite time. As already mentioned, this enlarged system includes, at least the measurement device
besides the measured system Q.
An important ingredient in the experimental setup we introduce to discuss the violation of the time Bell inequalities
is the device that makes the selection of the measurement directions. We would like to decouple the choice of these
directions from the rest of the measurement apparatus as much as possible. For that reason, we assume that this choice
is performed by a (deterministic) pseudorandom generator that has been previously designed (prior to the starting
of the experiment) and works independently of the measurement apparatus. As we will see later, the introduction of
this independent device plays a major role in the derivation of our time Bell inequalities.
Similar results to the ones reported above have been previously obtained by De Zela [2] by adding to the deter-
ministic postulate a non contextuality condition, which amounts to saying that initial conditions and measurement
directions are uncorrelated. But this condition becomes specially unjustified when determinism is assumed, since then
these directions depend on the initial conditions. In the present paper, we propose a kind of experiment for which
determinism by itself does not entail contextuality.
II. DETERMINISM AND THE VIOLATION OF TIME BELL-LIKE INEQUALITIES
We start with a large ensemble of free spin 1/2 particles numbered by n = 1, 2, 3, · · ·N , all of them prepared on
the same quantum state, and consider the following ideal experiment: we first fix a set of three space directions given
by the unit 3-vectors ~a, ~b and ~c. Then, on each particle we perform two successive spin measurements along two
randomly selected directions out of this set: We prepare one particle and make two consecutive measurements, then
prepare the next particle, reset time to zero and proceed in the same way, etc ...
These "free" particles could evolve interacting, to some extent, with their environment in an uncontrollable way,
and will certainly interact with the measurement apparatus. The latter includes the device that randomly selects
the two measurement directions out of the three initially fixed directions. Consider now the physical system that
includes the particles to be measured, the experimental facility and the interacting environment. In accordance with
the Introduction, we will refer to this system as the enlarged system, hereafter represented by E, and will assume that
such system can be considered as an isolated system during the whole experiment.
We now define our notion of determinism following what happens, for example, with Newtonian determinism
(where, aside from some “pathological” cases, the initial position and velocity, i. e., the initial conditions, allow us to
know some piece of the trajectory of a particle). We will make the corresponding deterministic hypothesis for the
enlarged system E. Then, not only the successive spin measurement outcomes, ±~/2, are determined from the
initial conditions on E, but also the successively selected measurement directions are determined too, whatever the
selection mechanism is: The precise way this will be implemented is discussed below. Notice that we do not impose
any restrictions on the assumed initial conditions: In particular, they could be non local, i.e. they could range over
non causally connected space-time regions.
Let us be more precise about our enlarged system and the measurement process, which is sketched in Fig. 1. We
denote by λ the initial conditions that we postulate to exist, complementary to the prepared state of the quantum
description, but leading to the same statistical predictions than this quantum description. These initial conditions
will belong not to the particle, but to the whole system E. Imagine that, each time we prepare our spin 1/2
particles, system E starts from different initial conditions, i. e., different λ values. We will perform two consecutive
spin measurements on each prepared particle. These two consecutive spin measurements will be performed at two
randomly selected times, out of three fixed values t1, t2, and t3 relative to the preparation time (which is always reset
to zero). To each selected time, t1, t2 or t3, we associate a constant measurement direction, ~a, ~b and ~c, respectively.
In other words, we originally establish a given correspondence {t1 → ~a, t2 → ~b, t3 → ~c} and keep it unchanged during
the measurement process for the entire set of particles. Thus, the randomness in the direction selection arises only as
a consequence of the randomness in the selected pair of times out of the set {t1, t2, t3}. The device (hereafter referred
to as P ) that selects the pair of times, (t1, t2), (t1, t3) or (t2, t3) (and so the choice of the pairs of measurement
directions) could, in fact, be a pseudorandom generator, as long as the statistics it provides for this selection is close
to a true random one. In the present paper, it is assumed to be previously manufactured (it could simply consist on a
deterministic pseudorandom computer program), and is included into the experimental setup prior to the starting of
3Figure 1: A sketch of the measurement apparatus, as described in the text. Ma, Mb andMc perform measurements on the system
Q (a spin 1/2 particle) according to the selection made by the deterministic device P . Only two consecutive measurements are
performed. The experimental setup is contained on some enlarged system E, which is assumed to be isolated.
the experiment: prior to the entire succession of measurement pairs. It will start producing the mentioned pairs from
a “seed” defined by a set of parameters which we represent by the initial condition Λ. Notice, then, that our device
P can be designed, in particular, in such a way that the series of pseudorandom choices is fixed, i.e., if we repeat the
measurement with a new set of N particles, while the starting Λ is the same as for the previous set, P will produce
exactly the same series of direction choices. The introduction of this deterministic selection device, which is working
independently of the rest of system E, will be a crucial point all along the present paper.
Then, let us denote by S the values of the particle measurement outcomes, which are conveniently normalized to
±1. According to the determinism postulate for our enlarged system, there exists a function (unknown to us) which
provides those outcomes for each value of time ti, starting from the initial conditions, i. e., the parameter values λ.
Let us represent this function by S = S(λ, ti, ~x(ti)), i = 1, 2, 3 , with ~x(ti) ∈ {~a,~b,~c}. Notice that this notation for
the function S is actually redundant: according to the above discussion, once we have fixed λ and ti, the value of S
becomes determined, therefore we could drop the argument ~x in S, although we will keep it for convenience in the
following discussion.
We now follow the original proof of usual Bell inequalities [3] in order to arrive to similar inequalities for our
consecutive measurement outcomes. Let us consider the following three expectation values:
P (a, b) =
ˆ
dλρ(λ)S(λ, t1,~a)S(λ, t2,~b), (2)
P (a, c) =
ˆ
dλρ(λ)S(λ, t1,~a)S(λ, t3,~c), (3)
P (b, c) =
ˆ
dλρ(λ)S(λ, t2,~b)S(λ, t3,~c), (4)
4where ρ(λ) stands for a the probability distribution of the λ values, which satisfies
´
dλρ(λ) = 1. There are some
subtelties related to the derivation of the above equations. The interested reader is addressed to the Appendix. Let
us go on with the derivation of our time Bell-like inequalities. We take the difference
P (a, b)− P (a, c) =
ˆ
dλρ(λ)S(λ, t1 ,~a) (5)
×[S(λ, t2,~b)− S(λ, t3,~c)]. (6)
Henceforth, the proof of the inequalities goes along the same lines as the proof of the original Bell inequalities in
Bell’s seminal paper [3]. First, since S2(λ, t2,~b) = 1, the above difference can be written as
P (a, b)− P (a, c) =
ˆ
dλ ρ(λ)S(λ, t1,~a)S(λ, t2,~b)
[1− S(λ, t2,~b)S(λ, t3,~c)]. (7)
Then, taking absolute values, we are led to
|P (a, b)− P (a, c)| ≤
ˆ
dλρ(λ)[1 − S(λ, t2,~b)S(λ, t3,~c)], (8)
that is, to the well known Bell inequality
|P (a, b)− P (a, c)| ≤ 1− P (b, c), (9)
now referring to two consecutive measurements on the same particle.
In QM, leaving aside the experimental difficulties to perform the kind of experiment we are considering (see [2] for
some sound proposals), the three mean values in (9) can be theoretically calculated as the corresponding expected
values. These values become P (a, b) = ~a.~b, irrespective of the spin particle state prior to the first measurement (see
for instance [4]) and similarly for P (b, c) and P (a, c). Thus, inequality (9) becomes
|~a.~b− ~a.~c|+~b.~c ≤ 1, (10)
which is violated for ~b.~c = 0 and ~a = (~b− ~c)/√2, in which case the left hand side of inequality (10) reaches the value√
2.
Thus, for the enlarged system consisting on 1/2-spin particles and the measurement apparatus, including the device
selecting, once forever, the time pairs and the corresponding measurement directions, plus the affecting environment
if any, the assumed determinism enters in contradiction with quantum mechanics. In other words, the essence of
the present paper is the following: could we consider any system E larger than the particle under study, so as
to encompass the measurement device, perhaps the laboratory and even beyond, in order to attain an enlarged
system whose evolution fulfills the deterministic assumption? Our claim is that, if the appropriate measurements
were performed and inequality (9) was found to be violated, as we expect from QM, then, no matter how large E was
assumed to be, the answer to this question would be negative.
At this point, it is interesting to compare our result with a similar one stated in [5]: there, under the following
three postulates, macroscopic realism per se, noninvasive measurability and induction, Leggett derives some Clauser-
Horn-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequalities [6, 7], relating the successive outcomes of a system with random dichotomic
responses against four types of measurements. Our determinism postulate entails macroscopic realism per se and
the induction postulate, and also noninvasive measurability for the enlarged system (the spin 1/2 particles plus the
environment including the measurement device). Thus, a difference between Leggett’s approach and ours is that we
replace the dubious non-invasive measurability for the measured system Q by a more clear postulate as determinism
for the isolated enlarged system, which does not entail noninvasive measurability for the measured system. Since
determinism is assumed for the whole system E, this implies that all variables in this system, including the system
being monitored, are defined at all times once some starting initial conditions λ are specified (even if unknown).
Non-invasive measurability for the spin 1/2 particle would mean that a measurement performed at time t1 will not
affect a measurement at time t2. Instead, determinism implies that measurements made at times t1 and t2 are
predetermined by some initial conditions, at the cost that these conditions belong to the whole system E. We recall
5here that noninvasive measurability has been criticized thoroughly in the literature. More recently, this hypothesis
has been discussed and criticized in [8].
Let us summarize the hypothesis we introduced in order to derive our time Bell-like inequalities (9), based on
determinism, as compared to other hypothesis currently made in similar areas:
• We assume determinism defined as follows: One can define an enlarged isolated system E that includes the
particles to be measured, the experimental setup and the surrounding environment, such that all variables
in that system evolve deterministically, from some unknown initial conditions λ. This amounts to assuming
noninvasive measurability, but for the whole system E, and not for the particles we are measuring.
Determinism implies causality: Initial conditions are not affected by measurements performed later in time.
• We do not need to assume freedom (or statistical independence) defined as follows: The joint distribution of values
for the initial conditions λ of the enlarged system and those providing the measuring directions factorizes. In our
setup, this independence is warrantied by the nature of the device P , which has been previously manufactured
and evolves deterministically from its own initial condition Λ. Notice that statistical independence corresponds,
in our case, to the above mentioned non-contextuality, that we did not need to assume.
• We do not need to assume reproducibility, as an extra hypothesis, defined as follows: The measured expecting
values reach standing values as the number of measurements increases beyond some definite given level. Repro-
ducibility may or not apply to a given system. In the considered case of a spin 1/2 particle reproducibility is
experimentally present and we would reach the standing values predicted by QM.
Conclusions
The results obtained in the present paper can be summarized as follows: Modulo the absence of any conspiracy
[7] and without any other restriction, we have proved that determinism for whatever enlarged system containing a
successively measured 1/2 spin, the measurement device and any possibly interacting environment, is in contradiction
with QM. It is to be remarked that the same absence of conspiracy is seen to be nedeed when proving the original Bell
inequalities [3] and other similar inequalities. Thus, either Quantum Mechanics, or determinism (as defined here),
must be false. So, if we accept QM, in view of its great success we must conclude that determinism would contradict
experiments.
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Appendix
As we show below, in order to arrive to Eqs. (2-4), we need to have in mind that the selection of the successive
direction pairs is performed according to some deterministic device, P (working as a pseudo-random generator). The
reason why we will need it in order to arrive to Eqs. (2-4) is that our deterministic system dynamics could correlate,
say, the pair {~a,~b} of measurement directions to a set of particular values of the λ variables. We name this hypothetical
subset {λab}, and similarly for {λac} and {λbc}, respectively. Consequently, in an evident notation, we would have
three different probability distributions, ρab, ρac and ρbc, instead a unique one, ρ(λ), as in Eqs. (2-4). Following these
ideas, one then should write
P (a, b) =
ˆ
dλρab(λ)S(λ, t1,~a)S(λ, t2,~b). (11)
P (a, c) =
ˆ
dλρac(λ)S(λ, t1,~a)S(λ, t3,~c). (12)
6P (b, c) =
ˆ
dλρbc(λ)S(λ, t2,~b)S(λ, t3,~c), (13)
instead of (2)-(4), and we could not conclude the proof of the time Bell inequalities (9). In all, we would have three
different probability spaces (one for each subset {λab}, {λac}, {λbc}) instead of a common probability space for the
three expectation values P (a, b), P (a, c), P (b, c).
But, can the set of initial conditions, {λ}, really split into three, perhaps overlapping, subsets {λab}, {λac} and
{λbc} (with corresponding probability distributions), as a consequence of the deterministic assumption, or can we
alternatively assume non contextuality, that is {λab} = {λac} = {λbc} ≡ {λ} with a common probability distribution,
despite determinism? Let us see why, in our case, determinism by itself does not imply contextuality, i.e. it does not
imply {λab} 6= {λac} 6= {λbc}:
1) First, remember that the two consecutive measurement directions of the pair (~x, ~y) on the nth particle are applied
at the consecutive corresponding times, say tx and ty, counted from the corresponding initial time tn, reset to zero
for each particle n. To this initial time, tn, it corresponds some initial condition λ, say λn. Now, let us invoke the
basic “principle of causality”, according to which the future cannot affect the past, which is actually included in our
deterministic hypothesis. Then, an action (the ~x or the ~y measurements on the particle) that is performed at tx or ty,
respectively, that is, after the initial time, cannot influence what was present for the particle in this previous initial
time: In other words, it cannot influence the corresponding initial condition λn. Thus, as we wanted to show, this
kind of action could never lead to the above hypothetical splitting.
2) However, this is by no means the end of the story, since perhaps things could go the other way around: we
mean that, perhaps each λn, let us say λn(xy) ≡ λxy is responsible, at least partially, for the ulterior two consecutive
measurements being just performed in the (~x, ~y) directions, thus finally splitting the set {λ} into the three subsets
{λab}, {λac} and {λbc}. But this loophole cannot hold since, by construction (by the deterministic character of P ), ~x
and ~y are functions of time and of the UNIQUE initial condition Λ, and so cannot depend on λ. In other words, the
selecting device P and the initial conditions λ are, by construction, uncorrelated in our setup. One might replace the
role played by this device in choosing the measuring directions by the hypothesis of “freedom” in making that choice,
so as to warrant that the joint distribution of values for λ and Λ factorizes [8]. Here we do not need to introduce
such a hypothesis since this factorization appears naturally, as a consequence of the assumption that our deterministic
device P has been previously designed and then included into the experiment, therefore it works independently of the
other elements of the full system.
All in all: the different kinds of measurement actions cannot be correlated with the different initial conditions λ,
as we wanted to prove.
There is still, in the above reasoning, a subtle difficulty to comment: perhaps the different initial conditions λ
never repeat completely themselves, such that the three hypothetical subsets, {λab}, {λac} and {λbc}, cannot achieve
an standing equality {λab} = {λac} = {λbc}, which would prevent us from using the above argument to prove that
determinism, by itself, does not lead to contextuality. Nevertheless, this hypothetical inequality would not be a
problem, since what is physically relevant are not the, for example, λab values by themselves, but the corresponding
function values S(λab, t1), entering in the expectation value P (a, b), in (11). Then, remember the ”reproducibility”
of the measurement outcomes, meaning by this that, in accordance to QM, those expectation values reach standing
values for a sufficiently large number, N , of measurement pairs. This implies that, beyond N , we still could formally
write P (a, b) in (11) using the same finite subset, {λab}, that we have used just for N . Thus, in practice, because
this “reproducibility” principle, (which, in the present case, can be taken as an experimental fact) we can use a finite
number of λab values, and the same for the λac and the λbc, to avoid our initial difficulty. As a result, we still can use
the above argument in favor of non contextuality in spite of the deterministic assumption.
But, even admitting the impossibility of the above splitting action driven by the deterministic postulate, it could
be still possible that the dynamics of system E is originally arranged in such a way that the values of the λ variables
are effectively correlated with the measurement directions because of the above possibility, raised by Bell, of an initial
conspiracy: Hence we necessarily would have to write (11-13), instead of (2-4), in the absence of a common probability
space. One can, in fact, design a deterministic device (or a computer program), in the sense that determinism is
defined in the present paper, that incorporates ad hoc such correlations, even the kind of correlations needed to
simulate QM, under the form of convenient distribution functions ρab, ρac and ρbc. Consequently, it is easy to see
that one could not go on and obtain the desired time Bell-like inequalities in such a case. At this point, we have to
stress that we are in a similar position to any derivation of usual Bell-like inequalities, including the ones derived in
[2], where this conspiracy has always to be ruled out, in order to complete any of these derivations.
Let us come back once more to the ”reproducibility” question. In the experimental setup described above, Eqs.
(2-4) are understood as an statistical average over a large number of particles. Each pair of measurements is in
correspondence, within our scheme, with some value λ. A comparison of these formulae with the experimental results
7only makes sense if the set of λ values “accessed” by the whole experiment is assumed to be statistically representative
of the whole set. Of course, in our case, where the enlarged system, E, includes the experimental set up and beyond,
one might argue that the space of hidden variables is so large that one could never achieve a representative subset of
the total, in which case no comparison with the experiment would be possible. However, in spite of this large size,
we have, according to QM, well defined expectation values P (x, y). Thus, we can assume that, after a sufficiently
large number of measurements, we achieve some sort of saturation for expressions Eqs. (2-4). That is, a further
increase in the number of measurements will not significantly change the result and the same experiment, repeated
under different initial conditions, will reproduce the same results: We insist, this is just what happens with our setup
according to QM predictions.
We think that it is important to have made explicit the postulate of ruling out the conspiracy, the observed (at least
in accordance with QM) ”reproducibility” of the measurement outcomes, and the incorporation of the deterministic
P device to select the successive measurement directions, as prerequisites to arrive to Eqs. (2-4) in order to test
determinism. It is important because, otherwise, the reader could object from the very beginning that we should
never be able to find a contradiction between experiments and unrestricted determinism, and then to conclude that
something has had to go wrong in the present paper with the claimed prediction of such a contradiction. The reader
might rise this objection because it seems intuitive that unrestricted determinism could always be initially arranged
so as to fulfill any subsequent behavior of the system.
In all, while the derivation of usual Bell inequalities assumes local realism, we have used here determinism to derive
our time Bell-like inequalities. Nevertheless, in both cases we need to rule out any conspiracy. A natural assumption
that we have taken for granted, in accordance to what is the usual practice in the literature on the subject.
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